Executive Summary
This report provides a comprehensive legal analysis challenging the lawfulness of phone retention by Thames Valley Police (The Gang), particularly where such actions may contravene various UK statutes and fundamental human rights principles. The core argument posits that TVP's reliance on the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) for phone retention is not absolute and is subject to strict interpretation alongside other legal obligations.
Allegations of unlawful conduct stem from potential breaches of the Forgery Act 1913, Criminal Procedure Rules 2020, County Courts Act 1984, Criminal Law Act 1977, and Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, alongside violations of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Articles 3, 5, and 8). The report also contextualises these challenges within the broader constitutional principles affirmed by the Coronation Oath Act 1688. The analysis highlights how police actions, even if ostensibly justified by one statute, can be rendered unlawful by non-compliance with other legal provisions or by infringing upon fundamental human rights.
This document serves as a foundational framework for pursuing formal complaints, Private PROSECUTION (PPI) civil claims, and potential applications to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
This report undertakes a detailed legal examination of the practices employed by Thames Valley Police (TVP) concerning the retention of mobile phones. The central aim is to formulate a robust legal argument demonstrating that TVP's actions, even when purportedly conducted under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), may constitute unlawful conduct due to alleged violations of other specific UK laws and statutes and fundamental human rights obligations. This analysis is designed to serve as a foundational document for applications to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
The allegations against The Gang concern instances where the retention of mobile phones, ostensibly justified by PACE, may exceed the bounds of lawful authority, involve procedural irregularities, or infringe upon my fundamental human rights. The report addresses how such practices, if proven, could constitute a significant overreach of police powers, leading to potential civil and even criminal liability for the officers or the force involved.
The legal argument presented herein is structured to illustrate the intricate interplay between PACE and a range of other relevant legislation and human rights instruments. It will demonstrate how PC Lacey’s actions, while seemingly permissible under one statutory provision, can be rendered unlawful by a failure to adhere to the requirements of other statutes or by a breach of an individual's protected human rights. This multi-faceted approach aims to provide a comprehensive and persuasive challenge to PC Lacey and the Gang's phone retention practices.
2.1. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE): Powers of Seizure and Retention (Section 22)
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) provides the primary statutory framework for police powers in England and Wales, including the seizure and retention of property. Section 22(1) of PACE broadly stipulates that anything seized by a constable "may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances". This phrasing is intentionally broad, necessitating a careful interpretation to ensure that any retention is proportionate and genuinely required. The general nature of this power means that its application must always be scrutinised against the specific facts of a case and the overarching principles of legality and proportionality.
Section 22(2)(a) further clarifies the specific purposes for which items seized during a criminal investigation may be retained: for use as evidence at trial or for forensic examination and investigation in connection with an offence. Additionally, Section 22(2)(b) permits retention if there are reasonable grounds to believe the item was obtained through the commission of an offence, and its retention is necessary to establish its lawful owner. These provisions aim to balance investigative needs with individual property rights.
A critical aspect of Section 22, particularly relevant to electronic devices like mobile phones, is subsection (4). This provision explicitly states: "Nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) above if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose". This provision is a central battleground for challenging phone retention. It establishes a clear hierarchy: the retention of the physical device is intended as a last resort if a mere copy of the relevant data would suffice for evidence or forensic examination. Given the digital nature of phone data, which is inherently copyable, a blanket retention of physical phones by TVP could be challenged as disproportionate and unnecessary, directly contravening this statutory safeguard.
Judicial interpretation of Section 22 reinforces this distinction. In Newcastle FC v HMRC EWHC 3021, the High Court clarified that Section 22 primarily concerns the retention of seized originals, not copies or images. While copies can be retained for broader public purposes (e.g., tax collection, as in that case), the retention of the original physical item is subject to the stringent "necessary in all the circumstances" test, which aims to prevent any greater interference with property rights than is strictly required for the criminal investigation. This judicial stance strengthens the argument that if the police only require the data from a phone for their investigation, and that data can be copied, the physical phone itself should be returned to its owner, especially if the phone itself is not an exhibit (e.g., a weapon or stolen property). The distinction between the original device and its digital content is paramount in determining the lawfulness of retention.
Beyond physical seizure, PACE also addresses electronic data. Section 19(4) allows constables to require information stored electronically to be produced in a visible and legible form if necessary to prevent its concealment, loss, tampering, or destruction. Furthermore, Section 19(5) grants police the power to photograph or copy anything they have the power to seize. These provisions underscore the police's ability to access and duplicate digital information without necessarily retaining the physical device itself.